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CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES IN
OKLAHOMA GUARDIANSHIP LAW




A guardianship is society's way of informing a person that he is
not competent to manage his personal and/or financial affairs, and that
for his own best interests the state will appoint a substitute decision
maker who will care for his person and his estate.2 Notwithstanding its
beneficent purpose, the imposition of an involuntary guardianship is a
serious infringement of the ward's personal freedom. By declaring a
person incompetent4 the court severely restricts his power to create or
modify legal relations with other persons.5 The foreseeable results of
imposing an unwanted guardian, however, extend well beyond the sig-
1. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
2. Kindred, Guardianship and Limitations upon Capacity, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED
CITIZEN AND THE LAW 63 (1976). For purposes of this comment, the term "guardian" will refer to
a person who is appointed by the court to care for the person and the property of an adjudicated
incompetent. The term "ward" will refer to a person who is declared incompetent and who is
found by the court to be in need of a guardian. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, §§ 1-22 (1971). See, e.g.,
In re Guardianship of Campbell, 405 P.2d 203, 207 (Okla. 1966). There is also statutory authority
in Oklahoma which allows the court to appoint only a guardian of the estate. This type of guard-
ian is called a "conservator." OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 890.1-.10 (1971). For a compilation of rele-
vant statutes and an analysis of their application to the property of adjudicated incompetents, see,
Report of the A.B.A. Committee on Legal Incapacity, Guardianshp of Property of Incompetents, 9
REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. 535 (1974). See also Alexander, Brubaker, Deutsche, Korner & Levine,
Surrogate Management of the Property ofthe Aged, 21 SYRAcusE L. REv. 87 (1969); Symposium on
the Law of Guardianship, 45 IowA L. REv. 209 (1960). For a general description of the history and
nature of guardianship, see Regan, Protective Servicesfor the Elderly: Commitment, Guardianshp,
and Alternatives, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569, 602-07 (1972).
3. Effland, Caringfor the Elderly Under the Uniform Probate Code, 17 ARIZ. L. REv. 373,
383 (1975). See also Horstmen, Protective Servicesfor the Elderly." The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40
Mo. L. REv. 215, 231 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Protective Services]; Comment, An Assessment of
the Pennsylvania Estate Guardianshp Incompetency Standard, 124 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1048, 1049
(1976); Comment, The Disguised Oppression of Involuntary Guardianshp: Have the Elderly Freedom
to Spend?, 73 YALE L.J. 676, 680 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Disguised Oppression].
4. An incompetent has been defined as
any person who, though not insane, is by reason of old age, disease, weakness of the
mind, or from any other cause, unable or incapable, unassisted, of properly taking care
of himself or managing his property, and by reason thereof would be likely to be
deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing persons.
In re Guardianship of Bogan, 441 P.2d 972, 974 (Okla. 1968).
5. Disguised Oppression, supra note 3, at 676.
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nificant deprivations of liberty and property. Inherent in any decree of
incompetency is a substantial amount of social stigmatization and a
concomitant loss of dignity similar to that occurring in civil commit-
ment.
Although involuntary guardianship and civil commitment pro-
ceedings cannot be equated for all purposes, the effects of each are
strikingly similar.' With respect to civil commitment, procedural pro-
tections have been increased by recent case law7 and legislative enact-
ments.' Unfortunately a commensurate increase has not occurred with
respect to guardianship proceedings. One reason for the lesser degree of
procedural protection afforded the alleged incompetent is suggested by
the regular judicial invocation of the mythical talismans-"best inter-
ests,"9 "preventative and protective,"'" and "parens patriae"' '-which
are supposedly descriptive of the proceeding as well as the role of the
state. Far too often, however, this language is used to conceal the
significant deprivations which occur in the guardianship process.12 The
practical effect of such language is reflected by the inordinate amount
of discretion vested in the probate courts.
Another proffered rationale for the current paucity of procedural
protections in guardianship hearings is related to its historic civil na-
ture. At one time, the civil-criminal distinction was a sufficient argu-
ment to defend lax procedures in the juvenile and civil commitment
areas.'3 In In re Winship,14 however, the Supreme Court specifically
rejected this line of argument. In the context of a juvenile delinquency
proceeding, the Court said, "[C]ivil labels and good intentions do not
themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards
" I' Clearly, the traditional arguments favoring reduced procedur-
6. One commentator suggests that the effects of an incompetency adjudication are similar to
"those attendant upon certain criminal convictions." Comment, Appointment a Guardiansfor the
Mentally Incompetent, 1964 DUKE L.J. 341, 348.
7. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Humphery v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504
(1972); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473, on remand, 379 F. Supp.
1376 (1974), remanded on other ground, 421 U.S. 957, on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1975).
8. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 54.1 (Supp. 1977).
9. See, e.g., In re Fox' Estate, 365 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Okla. 1961).
10. See, e.g., Shelby v. Farve, 33 Okla. 651, 659, 126 P. 764, 767 (1912); In re Nagle's Estate,
418 Pa. 170, -, 210 A.2d 262, 264 (1965).
11. See notes 79-87 infra and accompanying text.
12. Comment, An Assessment ofthe Pennsylvania Estate Guardianship Incompetency Standard,
124 U. PENN L. REV. 1048, 1049 (1976).
13. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 & n.22 (1967) (juvenile); Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (juvenile); In re Brown, 444 P.2d 304, 305 (Mont. 1968) (civil commitment).
14. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
15. Id at 365-66. The Tenth Circuit in Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968),
[Vol. 13:579
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al protections are no longer perfunctorily accepted in those areas analo-
gous to guardianship.
Neoteric conceptions of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal
Constitution compel the conclusion that Oklahoma guardianship pro-
cedure is in need of fundamental change. The purpose of this comment
is to delineate the constitutional deficiencies in the current law from
both due process and equal protection views. Additionally, suggestions
will be offered where applicable, as to how these defects can be elimi-
nated.
II. CURRENT OKLAHOMA PROCEDURE
Oklahoma guardianship law requires that a relative or friend of
the suspected incompetent file a verified petition with the probate court
alleging that the person is insane or otherwise incompetent to manage
his property.16 Upon receipt of such a petition, the court must give the
alleged incompetent notice of the time and place of the hearing on the
petition. 7 This notice must be personally served on the individual at
least five days before the time set for the hearing.' Failure to obtain
personal service deprives the court of jurisdiction to determine the va-
lidity of the allegations presented in the petition.' 9 Therefore any pro-
ceeding lacking the requisite statutory notice is void. Likewise, any
subsequent decree adjudging a person incompetent and appointing a
guardian will be subject to collateral attack.20
The alleged incompetent is required to appear at the hearing un-
concluded that the civil-criminal distinction was also inappropriate in a civil commitment setting.
In holding that the prospective mental patient had a constitutional right to counsel at the commit-
ment hearing, the court said that due process protections did not depend on "whether the proceed-
ings be labeled 'civil' or 'criminal' or whether the subject matter be mental instability or juvenile
delinquency." Id at 396. See also In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bartley v.
Kremins, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 431
U.S. 119 (1977). Clearly, due process safeguards are no longer limited to criminal proceedings. In
recent years the Supreme Court has mandated procedural protections in a number of areas con-
sidered exclusively civil. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 245 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (wage garnishment); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(juvenile delinquency proceedings); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (commitment under
state sex offender act); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (waiver hearing in juvenile
delinquency proceedings).
16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 851 (Supp. 1977).
17. Id.
18. Id. See McElroy v. Pegg, 167 F.2d 668 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 817 (1948); In re
Mize's Guardianship, 193 Okla. 164, 142 P.2d 116 (1943).
19. Colby v. Jacobs, 179 Okla. 170, 170, 64 P.2d 881, 882 (1937); Martin v. O'Reilly, 81 Okla.
261, 200 P. 687 (1921).
20. Martin v. O'Reilly, 81 Okla. 261, 200 P. 687 (1921).
1978]
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less unable to attend.2" He may employ counsel to present a defense to
the allegations made against him,22 but the court is not required to in-
form him of this right. 23 Similarly, the court is under no duty to ap-
point counsel for the alleged incompetent if he fails to appear at the
hearing or where he appears without counsel.24
The guardianship proceeding is denominated as "special," so the
question of incompetency is an issue of fact to be decided by the
court.2 If, after a full hearing, it "appears" to the court that the alleged
incompetent is "incapable of taking care of himself and managing his
property," a guardian must be appointed.26
The burden of proving incompetency is on the petitioner.2 The
statutory language, however, fails to specify the requisite degree of
proof.2 8 Likewise the Oklahoma courts have created as much uncer-
tainty as the legislature by construing the statutory language to require
only that the incompetence of the person must "clearly appear" from
the evidence before the court can appoint a guardian.29
21. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 851 (Supp. 1977). See, e.g., Petroleum Auditors Ass'n v. Landis, 182
Okla. 297, 77 P.2d 730 (1938); Bartlett v. Bell, 125 Okla. 236, 257 P. 309 (1926). While the prospec-
tive ward is required to be at the hearing, in actual practice he is seldom present. See R. Allen, E.
Ferster & H. Weihofen, MentalInpairment and Legal Incompetency, 8, 83 (1968) (Report of the
Mental Competency Study, An Empirical Research Project, conducted by The George Washing-
ton University Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Criminology, Under the Sponsorship of the Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health, Department of Health, Education and Welfare) [hereinafter
cited as Allen].
22. Mazza v. Pechacek, 233 F.2d 666, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (undeniable right to employ and
have counsel present at incompetency hearing); c Bradburn v. Mclntosch, 159 F.2d 925 (10th
Cir. 1947) (right to employ counsel for a restoration hearing).
23. See notes 93-112 infra and accompanying text. See also Allen, supra note 21, at 85.
24. Ned v. Robinson, 181 Okla. 507,510,74 P.2d 1156, 1160 (1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 550
(1938).
25. In re Washam's Estate, 364 P.2d 896, 898 (Okla. 1961) (special proceeding); In re
Thomas, 207 Okla. 321, 324, 249 P.2d 441, 444 (1952) (issue of fact decided by the court). A jury
trial is neither contemplated nor required in a guardianship proceeding. SeeNed v. Robinson, 181
Okla. 507, 74 P.2d 1156 (1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 550 (1938).
26. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 852 (1971). The "full hearing" which the statute requires may aver-
age only a few minutes due to crowded court dockets. See Allen, supra note 21, at ix, 87-88.
"Mental incompetency or incapacity is established when there is found to exist an essential priva-
tion of the reasoning faculities, or where a person is incapable of understanding and acting with
discretion in the ordinary affairs of life." In re Guardianship of Prince, 379 P.2d 845, 847 (Okla.
1963); Fish v. Deaver, 71 Okla. 177, 180, 176 P. 251, 253 (1918). For cases on this point, see those
collected at Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 774 (1966).
27. Q. In re Carney's Guardianship, 110 Okla. 165, 167, 237, P. 111, 113 (1925) (on a petition
for restoration of competency, the burden is on the petitioner to prove the ward has regained his
competency).
28. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 852 (1971) states in part: "If ... it appears to the judge . .. .
(emphasis added).
29. Fish v. Deaver, 71 Okla. 177, 180, 176 P. 251, 253 (1918). Generally, states allow courts to
make a finding of incompetence upon a mere preponderance of the evidence. See Protective
Services, supra note 3, at 254.
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Even though a determination of incompetency is reviewable on
appeal, 0 the decision to appoint a guardian is "grounded so deeply in
discretion"' I that the reviewing court generally allows the judgment to
stand if there is sufficient competent evidence to sustain the court's con-
clusion.3 2 Only where the judgment of the trial court indicates an abuse
of discretion3 3 or where it is clearly against the weight of the evidence
or contrary to law3 4 will the decision be overruled.3 5
Oklahoma law also provides for proceedings to determine an in-
competent's restoration to capacity.36 The statute allows the ward,37 his
guardian, a relative, or a friend38 to petition the court in which the
ward was declared incompetent to have his restoration to capacity judi-
cially determined. 9 The petition must allege that the ward is compe-
tent and capable of taking care of himself and his property. Therefore,
the burden of proof for restoration is placed on the petitioner.40
30. In reWasham's Estate, 364 P.2d 896, 898 (Okla. 1961); In rewinnett's Guardianship, 112
Okla. 43, 45, 239 P. 603, 605 (1925).
31. Comment, Appointment of Guardians for the Mentally Incompetent, 1964 Duke L.J. 341,
348.
32. In re Winnett's Guardianship, 112 Okla. 43, 45, 239 P. 603, 605 (1925).
33. In re Fox' Estate, 365 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Okla. 1961); Brigman v. Cheney, 27 Okla. 510,
510, 112 P. 993, 994 (1910).
34. Gould v. Smith, 405 P.2d 82, 83 (Okla. 1965). See In re Vaughn's Guardianship, 205
Okla. 438, 439, 239 P.2d 403, 404 (1951). Cf. Mellot v. Lambert, 161 Okla. 276, 279, 18 P.2d 532,
534 (1933) (court's decision to restore ward's competency will not be disturbed unless "plainly
wrong").
35. Much of Oklahoma's guardianship law is derived from the laws of California and South
Dakota. Kersey v. McDougal, 79 Okla. 53, 58, 191 P. 594, 599 (1920); Fish v. Deaver, 71 Okla.
177, 180, 176 P. 251, 253 (1918). These jurisdictions have allowed similar discretionary powers to
develop in their probate courts. See, e.g., In re Cowper's Estate, 179 Cal. 347, -, 176 P. 676, 677
(1918); In re Knott's Guardianship, 71 S.D. 53, -, 21 N.W.2d 59, 61 (1945).
An Indiana court recently described an appellate court's reluctance to set aside a trial court's
decision of incompetency. It said: "Only where the evidence is without conflict and leads inescap-
ably to but one conclusion and the trial court has reached a contrary conclusion will its decision
be set aside on grounds that it is contrary to law." In re Wurm, 360 N.E.2d 12, 16 (Ind. App.
1977).
36. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 854 (1971).
37. In re Barnett, 122 Okla. 160, 165, 252 P. 410, 414 (1927).
38. Friend means "one favorably disposed toward" the incompetent, "and acting for his inter-
est and benefit [with] no particular degree of intimacy being required." Ned v. Robinson, 181
Okla. 507, 507, 74 P.2d 1156, 1157 (1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 550 (1938).
39. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 854 (1971).
40. The restoration proceeding is a "continuation of the original proceeding." Bradburn v.
McIntosch, 159 F.2d 925, 931 (10th Cir. 1947). Therefore the procedures followed in the second
hearing will generally be the same as in the first. See, e.g., In re Vaughn's Guardianship, 205
Okla. 438, 239 P.2d 403 (1952). It should be noted that OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 854 (1971) unlike
Okla. Stat. tit. 58, § 851 (Supp. 1977), has no minimum time period between the issuance of notice
by the court and the time set for the restoration hearing. The rationale behind having no mini-
mum time is that the procedure should be "calculated to expedite a restoration proceeding," Brad-
burn v. McIntosch, 159 F.2d at 931, in the belief that if the ward has in fact regained his capacity,
then his rights and liberties should be reinstated as quickly as possible.
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III. POTENTIAL DEPRIVATIONS RESULTING A FROM DECLARATION
OF INCOMPETENCY
A. The scope of the fourteenth amendment'sprocedural guarantees
It has not gone unnoticed that an involuntary guardianship is a
serious deprivation of one's rights and liberties. In the past, American
courts have recognized the substantial detrimental effect of imposing
an unwanted guardian upon a person.4 ' In this respect, Oklahoma is no
exception.42 The fact that personal interests are affected in the guardi-
anship process, however, does not necessarily mean they are protected
by the fourteenth amendment's procedural guarantees. 43 Those guaran-
tees apply only when "the state seeks to remove or significantly alter"
interests that are within the meaning of either "liberty" or "property"
as used in the due process clause. 44
In Morrissey v. Brewer,4 the Supreme Court adopted a two-step
approach to determine whether due process applies in any given situa-
41. While holding that an adjudged incompetent had the right to appeal the original decision,
the Vermont Supreme Court, in Shumway v. Shumway, 2 Vt. 339 (1829), commented, "It would
be dangerous in the extreme to give courts of probate (which can have no jury), final jurisdiction
of causes of such vast importance as it respects the liberty and happiness of our citizens." Id at
340. In discussing the right of a ward to petition for his restoration to capacity, the Eighth Circuit
in Cockrill v. Cockrill, 92 F. 811 (8th Cir. 1899), said: "To deny him this privilege might be the
means by which evil-disposed persons could permanently restrain him of his liberty, and deprive
him of his rights." Id at 818. A New York court described the proceeding to appoint a committee,
the state's version of a guardian, as one "calculated to deprive a citizen, not only of the possession
of his property, but also of his personal liberty." In re Burke, 125 App. Div. 889, 891, 110 N.Y.S.
1004, 1006 (1908); accord, In re Ginnel, 43 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 (Sup. Ct. 1943). See generally N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 78.01-.31 (McKinney 1976). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in In re
Reed's Guardianship, 173 Wis. 628, 182 N.W. 329 (1921), intimated the seriousness of the pro-
ceeding when it said: "[I]t must also be borne in mind that liberty of the person and the right to
the control of one's own property are very sacred rights which should not be taken away or with-
held except for very urgent reasons." Id at -, 182 N.W. at 330.
42. The Oklahoma Supreme Court in In re Washam's Estate, 364 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1961),
stated: "It is clear that one's liberty and the right to control his property should not be taken away
or withheld except for urgent reasons." Id at 898 (quoting 25 AM. JUR. Guardian and Ward§ 18).
Accard, In re Guardianship of Bogan, 441 P.2d 972, 974 (Okla. 1968). In Fish v. Deaver, 71 Okla.
177, 176 P. 251 (1918), the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in a rare reversal of a trial court decision
for insufficiency of evidence, stated that "[c]itizens are not to be . . . lightly deprived of their
constitutional rights." Id at 180, 176 P. at 253.
43. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the United States Supreme Court noted that the
interests comprehended within the meaning of liberty and property, derive their "constitutional
status" from one of two sources. Either the interests "have been initially recognized and protected
by state law," id at 710; or they may alternatively be "guaranteed in one of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights which has been 'incorporated' into the fourteenth amendment." Id at 710 n5.
44. Id at 711; Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Before an
individual can invoke the protection of the fourteenth amendment, he must show that there has
been "state action." This term refers to exertions of state power in all forms. It is a long established
proposition that the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities constitutes
state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948).
45. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
6
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tion.46 The initial inquiry is not merely to evaluate "the 'weight' of the
individual's interest," but rather to determine if the nature of the pri-
vate interest affected is "within the contemplation of the 'liberty or
property' language of the fourteenth amendment."47 Once having de-
cided that due process applies, the analysis focuses upon the appropri-
ate process for the particular situation.
48
The Supreme Court has not attempted to precisely define the term
"liberty." It has held, however, that the word includes some definite
concepts.
Without a doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized. . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
freemen.49
In similar fashion, the Court has declined to specifically delimit
the term "property." It has concluded that property interests protected
by the due process clause "extend well beyond actual ownership of real
estate, chattles or money."5 Property basically connotes "a broad
range of interests that are secured by 'existing rules or understand-
ings."' 5 The threshhold question remains, therefore whether the rights
and interests affected by a determination of incompetency under
Oklahoma guardianship law are embodied within the language of the
due process clause.
46. For an analysis of this approach, see Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsi-
dized Housing, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 880, 887-93 (1973).
47. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Compare Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972) (teacher who had ten one-year contracts with the state university system which had no
formal tenure program, had a property interest which required procedural due process protection
if he could prove a de facto tenure program) with Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972) (non-tenured assistant professor dismissed after one year employment has no
property interest within the meaning of the due process clause).
48. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). For the second step of the analysis, see
notes 72-73 infra and accompanying text.
49. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922)). "A liberty is 'fundamental' in the Court's view not because of
its subjective importance to the individual, but rather because it finds a place in the provisions of
the Constitution or in the scheme of social organization the Constitution is believed to have
sought to protect." Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentaly III: Pratical Guides
and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1155 (1972). For a historical analysis of the
term "liberty," see Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term Liberty in Those Clauses in the Federal
and State Constitutions which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property" 4 HAnv. L. REv. 365 (1891).
50. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
51. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
1978]
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B. Interests within the meaning of liberty andproperty
Upon a determination of incompetency and issuance of letters of
guardianship, the guardian is given "power over the person and the
property of the ward unless otherwise ordered. ' 2 The guardian's
power over the person entails custody of the ward;53 consequently he
"may fix the residence of the ward at any place within the state, but not
elsewhere, without permission of the court. 5 4
The extent of the guardian's authority can be seen in the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in In re Grays Estate.55 There the
court encountered a situation where the guardian placed his ward in an
out-of-state sanatorium for treatment of tuberculosis pursuant to an or-
der from the county court authorizing the move. The court's primary
focus was on the issue of whether the lower court's order, permitting
removal of the ward to an out-of-state hospital, authorized the guard-
ian to establish the ward's residence in Colorado. The case, however,
may be cited for the proposition that the guardian, acting in concert
with the court, can place the ward in an institution such as a hospital or
nursing home.56
This position receives additional support from a provision in Okla-
homa's mental health law. The pertinent statute permits the guardian
of a person to "petition the superintendent of an institution for mental
health for the admission of his ward."57 Therefore the determination of
incompetence assumes even greater importance since the incompetent
52. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 14 (1971).
53. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 15 (1971). But see Expare Fortune, 175 Okla. 514, 53 P.2d 1100
(1936) (per curiam). See generally Fraser, Guardianshp of the Person, 45 IowA L. REv. 239 (1960).
54. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 15 (1971). See, e.g., InreCamp's Guardianship, 192 Okla. 265, 266,
135 P.2d 973, 974 (1943). But f Groseclose v. Rice, 366 P.2d 465, 468-69 (Okla. 1961) (ward may,
under certain circumstances, change his residence from one state to another without permission of
his guardian or the court).
55. 119 Okla. 219, 250 P. 422 (1926).
56. See, e.g., Browne v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 593,-, 107 P.2d 1, 4 (1940), where the
decision of the California Supreme Court implied that a guardian, without authorization from the
court, could arrange for a hospital to care for the ward as long as the arrangements were reason-
able and were for the benefit of the ward. But see Exparte Spurrier, 111 Okla. 242, 238 P. 956
(1925) (guardian of minors could not delegate his powers or divest his responsibilities without an
order from the court). See generally Protective Services, supra note 3, at 232.
Chief Justice Burger, concurring in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578 (1975), recog-
nized the ability of the state to deprive the individual of his liberty through a guardianship. While
discussing the "historic parenspatriae power" of the state, he suggested that "an inevitable conse-
quence of exercising the. . . power is that the ward's personal freedom will be substantially re-
strained, whether a guardian is appointed to control his property, he is placed in the custody of a
private third party, or committed to an institution." Id. at 583.
57. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 58 (1971) further provides that "[tihe superintendent may admit
said incompetent if, in his judgment, the mental condition of the incompetent is of such nature as
to make it necessary that he should receive hospital treatment or care."
[Vol. 13:579
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individual is subject to compulsory hospitalization at his guardian's
discretion without the normal procedural safeguards. 8
There is no doubt that a fundamental ingredient of personal lib-
erty is freedom from bodily restraint. 9 Therefore, if the guardian is
able to determine the ward's place of residence within the state and can
require that he remain at the residence for treatment, then the potential
loss of liberty for the alleged incompetent is within the contemplation
of the "liberty" language of the fourteenth amendment. It is of little
constitutional consequence that the residence of the ward is called a
nursing home or general hospital.61 What is constitutionally significant
is that the guardian can require the ward to remain there.61
58. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 261 (1971 ed.)
thereinafter cited as A.B.A. STUDY]. But see Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430, 432 (M.D.
Tenn. 1974). Cf. In re Long, 25 N.C. App. 702, 214 S.E.2d 626 (1975) (juvenile committed by
mother). In Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971), the Second
Circuit stated that when the state is acting as parenspatriae with respect to one adjudged mentally
incompetent, forced medical treatment is acceptable.
While it may be true that the state could validly undertake to treat Miss Winters if it did
stand in a parenspatriae relationship to her and such a relationship may be created if
and when a person is found le,%ally incompetent, there was never any effort on the part of
the appellees to secure such a judicial determination of incompetency before proceeding
to treat Miss Winters in the way they thought would be 'best for her.
Id. at 71 (dictum). See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976). See also Note, The
Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134, 1139-40 (1967). Presumably concomitant with
the power to force treatment upon the ward would be the power to require that the ward remain in
a place where the treatment is given. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 578 (1975), noted that "involuntary confinement of an individual for anyreason, is a
deprivation of liberty which the state cannot accomplish without due process of law." Id. at 580
(emphasis added). See generally Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969); In re Quinlan, 137
N.J. Super. 227 (Ch. Div. 1975), modified and remanded, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re
Williams, 319 P.2d 586 (Okla. 1957).
59. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589
(1897).
60. Cf In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) where the Court noted that the title of the institution
to which the juvenile is sent upon a determination of delinquency has little practical value for due
process analysis. The prime factor to be considered is whether it is "an institution of confinement
in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time."
61.
Measures which subject individuals to the substantial and involuntary deprivation
of their liberty contain an inescapable punitive element, and this reality is not altered by
the fact that the motivations that prompt incarceration are to provide therapy or other-
wise contribute to the person's well-being or reform. As such, these measures must be
closely scrutinized to insure that power is being applied consistently with those values of
the community that justify interference with liberty for only the most clear and compel-
ling reasons.
Livermore, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PENN. L. REV. 75 n.l (quoting F.
Allen, The Borderland of Criminal Justice 37 (1964)).
The United States Supreme Court has shown special concern for freedom from physical
confinement. In Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 113 (1966), an equal protection case dealing
with civil commitment of prisoners after completion of a penal sentence, the Court acknowledged
the impact of commitment on "fundamental rights." In Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270,
276-77 (1940), while validating a state commitment statute for sexual psychopaths, the Court rec-
ognized "the special importance of maintaining the basic interests of liberty in a class of cases
9
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Coincident to. the potential deprivation of personal liberty, a per-
son who is declared incompetent is divested of control over his prop-
erty.62 He loses the right to contract and convey,63 the right to marry,64
the right to drive a motor vehicle,65 and the right to practice certain
licensed professions.66
where the law. . . may be open to serious abuses in administration." In cases dealing with juve-
nile delinquency, In reGault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Court
premised its close scrutiny of procedures on the fact that "liberty" was in jeopardy. Gault, 387
U.S. at 27; Winship, 397 U.S. at 366, 368. In a criminal context, Justice Harlan noted in his concur-
ring opinion in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259 (1970), that past decisions "unquestionably
show that this Court will squint hard at any legislation that deprives an individual of his lib-
erty-his right to remain free." Id at 263 (emphasis added). See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975) (persons civilly committed are entitled to due process); Humphrey v. Cady,
405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (civil commitment entails a "massive curtailment of liberty"); Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967) (a proceeding which leads to confinement of the individual,
whether it is called civil or criminal, is subject to the equal protection clause and the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(civil commitment is "an extraordinary deprivation of liberty which cannot occur without due
process of law"); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968) (with the awesome pros-
pect of incarceration, the proceeding, whether labeled civil or criminal, requires due process safe-
guards); Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1965) (notwithstanding the states beneficent
motives, an individual who is subject to a proceeding which may lead to incarceration, is entitled
to procedural due process). See generally Protective Services, supra note 3, at 231-35. The guardi-
anship also leads to a constriction of the rights of travel and association. Justice Douglas has said
that these rights make "all other rights meaningful-knowing, studying, arguing, exploring, con-
versing, observing and even thinking. Once the right to travel is curtailed, all other rights suffer,
just as when curfew or home detention is placed on a person." Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
62. The right to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property has received recognition by the
Supreme Court as a fundamental right. "The right to enjoy property without unlawful depriva-
tion, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a 'personal' right .... In fact,
a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right
in property." Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). See also Jones v.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See Effiand, Carngfor the Elderly Under the Uniform Probate
Code, 17 ARIZ. L. REv. 373, 383 (1975). See generaly OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 16 (1971) (power of
the guardian of the estate); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 890.1-.10 (1971) (conservatorship statutes).
63. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922); Pyeatte v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma, 102 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Okla. 1951), af,', 342 U.S. 936 (1952). In
Pyeatte, the district court noted that it was "undoubtedly true that the right to contract is both a
liberty and a property right within the protection of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal
Constitution." 102 F. Supp. at 412. Oklahoma, like most states, prohibits a person who has been
declared incompetent from contracting or conveying until restored to capacity. OKLA. STAT. tit.
15, § 24 (1971). See, e.g., National Life Ins. Co. v. Jayne, 132 F.2d 358, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1942).
See generally Allen, supra note 21, at 260; Weihofen, Mental Incompetency to Contract or Conve;
39 So. CAL. L. REv. 211 (1966). Guardianship helps to resolve the quandry presented by two
conflicting policies. The first manifests itself in the rule of law allowing a person to avoid transac-
tions which he has entered into while incompetent. The second emphasizes the need in a commer-
cial society to accord finality and certainty to all transactions so that commercial activity may
continue unimpeded. Allen, supra note 21, at 71-73.
64. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 1 (1971). But see Ross v. Ross, 175 Okla. 633, 54 P.2d 611 (1936)
(per curiam).
65. O..A. STAT. tit. 47, § 6-103(5) (1971).
66. Liberty means the right "to engage in any of the common occupations of life." Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). OKLA. STAT.
tit. 5, Ch. 1, App. 1, Art. 2, § 7(b) (1971), provides that "[a]ny member of the [Bar] Association
10
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In addition to the significant loss of personal and economic rights,
the ward is stigmatized by the adjudication of incompetence.67 The
Supreme Court, in In re Winshi'p,68 recognized that an individual's rep-
utation, along with his personal liberty, are interests of immense impor-
tance which require procedural protection.69 In Wisconsin v.
Constantineau,7 ° the court again recognized that stigmatization was a
deprivation of liberty in the constitutional sense. In so holding, the
Court said: "[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integ-
rity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice
and an opportunity to be heard are essential. 71
It is clear that in Oklahoma, a declaration of incompetency, and
the appointment of a guardian, result in a serious deprivation of per-
sonal rights and liberties cognizable under either the "liberty" or
"property" language of the fourteenth amendment.
IV. WHAT PROCESS Is DUE
Once the constitutional stature of the deprivation is established,
the second step under the Morrissey analysis is to determine what pro-
cess is due.72 This determination is made by "balancing, with respect to
each procedural protection, the magnitude of the individual interests
and the importance of the procedure in protecting them, against the
countervailing state objectives." 73
who shall have been adjudged to be insane, mentally incompetent, or mentally ill shall not prac-
tice law." OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 567.8(5) (1971), allows the Board of Nurse Registration to deny or
revoke a license to practice registered nursing to one who has been judicially declared incompe-
tent. See generally Allen, supra note 21, at 354; Johnson, Due Process in Involuntary Civil Commit-
ment and Incompetency Adjudication Proceedings: Where Does Colorado Stand?, 46 DEN. L.J. 516,
573-78 (1969).
67. Protective Services, supra note 3, at 234. See Article, Limitations on Individual Rights in
California Incompetency Proceedings, 7 U.C.D.L. REv. 457, 479 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Indi-
vidual Rights].
68. 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a juvenile delinquency hearing is
an essential of due process and fair treatment).
69. Id. at 367.
70. 400 U.S. 433 (1971). There the police chief of Hartford, pursuant to a state statute, posted
notice in all liquor stores forbidding the sale or gift of liquor to the appellee because of the latter's
excessive drinking habits. The Court held that the posting of notice was such a stigma or badge of
disgrace that it required procedural due process protections.
71. Id. at 437; accord, Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
See also In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633, 636 (2d
Cir. 1971). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (Interest in reputation, standing alone,
is "neither 'liberty' nor 'property' guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of
law.").
72. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
73. Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190,
1271 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment]. "Due process of
law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essen-
1978]
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To effectuate the guarantees of the Federal Constitution, a system
has been developed "whereby a person who may be subject to a griev-
ous loss of liberty is entitled to adequate procedural safeguards."74 The
procedural requirements, however, will always vary according to the
situation. In this regard, due process is "flexible"" and "not
static."76Therefore, any determination of the appropriate procedures
required by due process in a given situation must begin by identifying
the specific governmental function involved."
The prime function of a guardianship is to protect the ward and
his property during the period in which he is unable to do so himself.
78
The state's role is envisioned as that of a protector who acts in parens
patriae toward incompetents.79 The Supreme Court in Mormon Church
v. United States,"° suggested that the state's parenspatriae power, like
its police power, is ingrained in the fabric of the modem state.8' In Kent
tial term in the social compact which defines the rights and delimits the powers which the state
may exercise." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967).
74. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1045 (E.D. Pa, 1975), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 431 U.S. 119 (1977) (remanded for reconsideration of class definition). As Justice
Douglas noted in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971), "It is significant that most
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural, for it is procedure that makes the difference
between rule by law and rule by fiat."
75. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
76. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1086 (ED. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 473, on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), remanded, 421 U.S. 957, on
remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1975).
77. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 263
(1970); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
78. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 643 (1947); In re Guardianship of Campbell, 450 P.2d
203, 207 (Okla. 1966).
79. The theory of protecting incompetents has a long history. Formal procedures for the pro-
tection of an incompetent's property were readily available during the time of Cicero. See A.B.A.
STUDY, supra note 58, at I. "Guardianship of the mentally disabled in Medieval England was the
function of the lord of the manor, who was to protect ... [the ward's] proprietary and personal
interests." Id at 250. By the fourteenth century, guardianship was offically recognized in English
law by the enactment of the statute De Praerogativa Regis, 17 Edw. II, Ch. 9-10 (1324), whereby
the rights of wardship were surrendered to the king and exercised through the Lord Chancellor.
See generally I F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, The History of English Law 464 (2d ed. 1898);
A.B.A. STUDY, supra note 58, at 250. The role of the sovereign in the care and protection of a
mentally disabled person was designated as that of parenspatriae, a term used to describe the
king's position as the father of the country. See Protective Services, supra note 3, at 218. For an
historical analysis of the origin and purpose of the doctrine in England, see Hawks v. Lazaro, 202
S.E.2d 109 (V. Va. 1974).
By the time the American colonies were settled, the king acted as "the general guardian of
all infants, idiots, and lunatics." Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (quoting 3
W. BLACKSTONE, Commentaries 47 (1783)). When the colonies united, each state assumed respon-
sibility for the mentally unsound within its boundaries. Jurisdiction over infants, incompetents,
and the mentally impaired was vested in the local courts of equity. See A.B.A. STUDY, supra note
58, at 250.
80. 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
81. The Court said:
This prerogative of parenspatriae is inherent in the supreme power of every state,
12
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v. United States,82 the Court described the parens patriae role of the
state as being parental rather than adversarial.83 While acknowledging
the laudable state objective of providing juvenile courts, the Kent
Court noted that functioning in a parental role is never to be construed
as "an invitation to procedural arbitrariness."84
This theme was reiterated in In re Gault 5 a year later. There the
Court refused to validate a scheme of reduced procedural safeguards in
a juvenile delinquency hearing when the state premised its validity
solely on the parenspatriae power. In rejecting the state's argument, the
Court cautioned "that unbridled discretion, however benevolently mo-
tivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure."8 6
The thrust of the Gault holding requires that a court candidly appraise
any claim for reduced procedural and substantive safeguards which
seeks justification on the basis of the parenspatriae doctrine.87
The impact of Gault was immediate in analgous areas. In a civil
commitment context, the Tenth Circuit in Heryford v. Parker88 held
that the reasoning of Gault applied whenever an individual's liberty
was at stake.89 In affirming the lower court's conclusion that the com-
mitted patient had been denied his constitutional right to counsel at the
initial hearing, the court noted that whenever the state acts in parens
patriae, "it has the inescapable duty to vouchsafe due process." 90
[ it] has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irre-
sponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their
liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to be
exercised in the interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who
cannot protect themselves.
Id. at 57. See also Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment, supra note 73, at 1208. With
language such as the foregoing, it is not surprising that courts have often viewed the police power
and the parenspatriae power as synonymous. See, e.g., Developments in the Lan- Civil Commit-
ment, supra note 73, at 1201-59; Protective Services, supra note 3, at 224-25.
82. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). There the Court held that a juvenile was entitled to procedural due
process before the juvenile court could make a valid waiver of its exclusive jurisdiction.
83. Id. at 555.
84. Id.
85. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
86. Id. at 18.
87. Id, at 21. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring).
88. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). The case involved a habeas corpus proceeding instituted by
a mother on behalf of her son who had been committed to a state training school for the feeble-
minded and the epileptic.
89. Id. at 396. The Wyoming statutes, Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-444 to 9-449 (1957), required the
court to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the proposed patient only if the subject was a
minor without a parent or guardian.
90. Id. Accord Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1097 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473, on remand 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), remanded on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 957, on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1975); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp.
966, 972 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
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The mandate from Gault is clear. Courts should look through the
state's benevolent role as parenspatriae to the substance of the guardi-
anship proceeding in determining which procedural safeguards are
needed to adequately protect the prospective ward from unjustified en-
croachment of his rights and liberties.91 When deprivations are inher-
ent in the process, and the interests involved are within the scope of the
fourteenth amendment's protection, the procedures by which the facts
are determined are clearly as important as the validity of the substan-
tive law being applied. 2
A. Notice
In Mullane v. Central Hanover & Trust Co.,93 the Supreme Court
reiterated a basic tenet of constitutional law. It held that in any pro-
ceeding which is to be accorded finality, due process requires notice
that is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances" of the case,
to inform the interested parties of the nature and purpose of the im-
pending action.94 Oklahoma guardianship law requires only that notice
of the time and place of the hearing be given to the alleged incompe-
tent.95 Nevertheless, since the statute uses the term "notice" it can be
argued that the legislature means such notice as is required by the due
process clause. So construed, the statute would be constitutional on its
face.96 In practice, however, the form and substance of the notice actu-
ally given are rarely adequate to meet constitutional standards. 97
It is questionable, in light of the Supreme Court holding in Covey
v. Town of Somers,98 whether the minimum statutory notice of time
and place is reasonably calculated to inform an alleged incompetent of
the nature and purpose of the proceeding. In Covey, the Court dealt
with the constitutional sufficiency of notice by mail to an individual
91. See, e.g., Quesnell v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 224,-, 517 P.2d 568, 574-75 (1973).
Justice Brandeis, perhaps too early for his time, recognized the inherent problems involved in
a parenspatriae type of philosophy. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting), he said: "Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the government's purposes are beneficent .... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." Id at 479.
92. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1958).
93. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In Mullane, the issue was the constitutional sufficiency of notice to
beneficiaries on judicial settlement of accounts by the trustee of a common trust fund.
94. Id. at 314. See French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. l1351, 1356 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Suzuki v.
Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1127 (D. Haw. 1976).
95. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 851 (Supp. 1977). See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
96. See French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1356 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
97. In Oklahoma, the standard guardianship notice form merely contains an indication of the
nature of the proceeding, the date, time, and place of the hearing. See HUFF, OKLAHOMA PRO-
BATE LAW AND PRAcTIcE § 594 (1957).
98. 351 U.S. 141 (1956). This case involved ajudicial forclosure of a tax lien on real property.
[Vol. 13:579
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who was known to be mentally deficient by the community. The Court
rejected the town's argument that it was not required by the fourteenth
amendment to give the suspected incompetent notice beyond that
deemed adequate for an ordinary taxpayer.99 Instead, the Court held
that since the notice was given to a person of known disability, despite
the town's compliance with an otherwise valid statute, the Mullane
standard was not fulfilled. 00
While Covey deals with the deprivation of property rights, guard-
ianship proceedings have even more at stake for the prospective ward
in terms of fundamental rights and liberties. 10 Considering the type of
proceeding, the kind of individual involved, and the critical nature of
the rights, it would seem that the form and content of notice ought to
warrant closer judicial scrutiny than has been accorded them in the
past.'0 2 In recent years, similar conclusions have been reached regard-
ing notice provisions in the civil commitment context.
In Lessard v. Schmidt, °3 a three judge federal court held that
when a state seeks to impinge upon a person's fundamental right to
liberty, it must give the person notice designed not only to facilitate the
preparation of his defense, but also to inform him of his rights through-
out the commitment proceeding."°4 In a similar fashion, the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court, in Hawks v. Lazaro, °5 determined that the
state's notice provision for civil commitment, while constitutional its
face, was unconstitutional as applied. In granting a writ of habeas
corpus to the petitioner, the court stated that for notice to be meaning-
ful it must "contain a detailed statement of the grounds upon which the
commitment is sought," as well as a statement of the basic facts sup-
porting the conclusion that the individual is in need of commitment. 10 6
99. Id. at 146.
100. Id. The legal implication of the Covey holding is clear. The requirements of notice are
greater when given to one of suspected mental disability than when given to a normal individual.
101. See notes 52-71 supra and accompanying text.
102. Protective Services, supra note 3, at 239.
103. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S.
473, on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957, on remand,
413 F. Supp. 1318 (1975).
104. The court in Lessard stated that
[n]otice of date, time and place is not satisfactory. The patient should be informed of the
basis of his detention, his right to jury trial, the standard upon which he may be de-
tained, the names of examining physicians and all other persons who may testify in favor
of his continued detention, and the substance of their proposed testimony.
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1092. Accord Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1127
(D. Haw. 1976). See generally Kalcheim, Protecting the Aged Person-The Commitment
Procedure, 10 FAM. L.Q. 161 (1976).
105. 202 S.E.2d 109 (W.Va. 1974).
106. Id. at 124.
1978]
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The court also noted that before such notice could satisfy constitutional
standards, it must inform the individual of his rights, especially his
right to counsel. 10
7
With respect to the Supreme Court's holdings in Covey' 8 and
Mullane,0 9 it is clear that notice which contains only the time and
place of the guardianship hearing is not "reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances,"' 10 to inform the individual of the nature and
purpose of the hearing. Likewise, it cannot be denied that this type of
notice does little to inform the individual of his rights at the hearing or
to convey the seriousness of an adverse determination by the court.
While due process requires meaningful notice, what the alleged incom-
petent normally receives is a "mere gesture" which should be constitu-
tionally suspect."'
Therefore, in order to avoid a successful due process challange,
notice in Oklahoma guardianship proceedings should contain more
than a clear description of the nature and purpose of the hearing. It
should also contain a description of the alleged incompetent's legal
rights and recourses, and briefly describe the adverse effects which arise
upon a finding of incompetency." 2
B. The Right to Counsel.
The alleged incompetent has the right to hire counsel to represent
him at the incompetency hearing." 3 Quite often, however, the person
for whom the guardian is sought has no knowledge of this right. Fur-
thermore, few jurisdictions require their courts to inform the prospec-
107. Id. See French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977), where a three judge
federal court found "little merit" to the plaintiffs due process challenge to the notice provision
contained in the North Carolina civil commitment procedure. After holding the statute constitu-
tional on its face, the court went on to hold that the notice actually given to the plaintiff was
entirely adequate under the standard enunicated in Mullane v. Central Hanover & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950), because it included not only the time, date, and place of the hearing, but also its
purpose, his right to counsel and a statement of the possible adverse ramifications of the court's
decision. 428 F. Supp. at 1356.
108. See notes 98-100 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text.
110. Mullane v. Central Hanover & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
111. In Mullane the Court said: "[W]hen notice is a person's due, process which is a mere
gesture is not due process." Id. at 315.
112. See Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1127 (D. Haw. 1976); Allen, st16ra note
21, at 240. The new California notice provision for guardianship proceedings can serve as a model
notice statute. The contents of a notice citation to an alleged incompetent must include, among
other things: (I) a specific delineation of the legal standards for the appointment of a guardian; (2)
the effects of an adjudication of incompetency in terms of rights affected; (3) the rights of the
alleged incompetent at the hearing, such as the right to counsel, jury trial, and the right to appear
and oppose the petition. CAL. PROB. COD § 1461 (West Supp. 1977).
113. See Mazza v. Pechacek, 233 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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tive ward of his legal rights. Consequently, many who are subject to
these proceedings are not represented at the incompetency hearing.' 14
This raises the question of whether the court should appoint counsel for
the unrepresented individual.' 15
Oklahoma, like many other states, 16 has no statutory provision for
court appointment of counsel when the alleged incompetent is unrepre-
sented at the hearing."I 7 In Ned v. Robinson,"18 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court was asked to supply this provision "by implication." Although
the court was impressed by the petitioner's arguments, it would not im-
ply, from the statutes, a right to appointed counsel." 9 Nevertheless, the
court did not examine whether this right existed under the due process
clause; nor has it addressed this issue in subsequent cases.
In a criminal felony context, the United States Supreme Court has
said that the "right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."' 20 In Argersin-
ger v. Hamlin'21 the Supreme Court de-emphasized the importance of
the classification of the crime and extended the right to appointed
counsel to all criminal proceedings in which the accused may be denied
his liberty.122 While the guardianship proceeding is not a criminal mat-
114. See Allen, supra note 21, at 8, 85; Disguised Oppression, supra note 3, at 685. California
is one state which requires its courts to inform the prospective ward of his rights. CAL. PROB.
CODE § 1461.5 (West Supp. 1977).
115. Allen, supra note 21, at 85. See Protective Services, supra note 3, at 244.
116. See A.B.A. STUDY, supra note 58, at 280-88 (Fable 8.3, Counsel and Guardian ad litem
column).
117. There are two views on the role of appointed counsel in an incompetency hearing. One
view is that counsel should be neutral and should act as an officer of the court in the fact finding
process. Cf. Mazza v. Pechacek, 233 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (civil commitment hearing). The
other view is that counsel should take the traditional adversarial role and present his client's case
in its most favorable light. Cf. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 563 (1966) (juvenile delin-
quency hearing); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (civil commitment
hearing). See generaly Allen, supra note 21, at 89; Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counselfor
Persons Facing Civil Commitment: .4 Survey, .4 Polemic, and4 Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43 (1974);
Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ii, 44 TEx. L. REy. 424
(1965).
118. 118 Okla. 507, 74 P.2d 1156 (1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 550 (1938).
119. We do think, however, that in the matter of appointing a guardian ad litem. . . it
would have been far wiser for the legislature to provide for some form of protection,
which has been done in several states, but in the absence of such provision we are with-
out power to create it, under color of the doctrine ofimplication, for there is no statutory
provision or wording upon which to base such implication.
Id. at 510, 74 P.2d at 1160 (emphasis added).
120. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
121. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
122. This theme was further expressed in the Court's holding where it quoted with approval
the Oregon Supreme Court decision in Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Or. 94, 102, 458 P.2d 414, 418
(1969) which stated: "[w]e hold that no person may be deprived of his liberty who has been denied
the assistance of counsel. ... Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1972).
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ter,'2 3 its civil nature does not in itself obviate the need for having the
due process safeguard of appointed counsel for the alleged incompe-
tent. In fact, legal representation is now required in civil proceedings
analogous to the guardianship situation. 24
In a juvenile setting, 125 the Supreme Court in Kent v. United
States126 determined that procedural due process was required in a
hearing where the juvenile court may waive its exclusive jurisdiction to
the adult court. Without considering the merits of the waiver, the Court
held that because the juvenile would be exposed to a more severe sanc-
tion the proceeding was unconstitutional unless the juvenile had "the
effective assistance of counsel."1 27 One year later, the Court in In re
Gault 28 extended the Kent holding to cover proceedings which deter-
mine delinquency. Due to the "awesome prospect of incarceration," it
reasoned that an individual vitally needed the assistance of counsel in
preparing defenses, identifying questions of law, conducting a proper
examination of any witness, and generally assuring the individual of a
fair hearing. 12 9
An area most analogous to the guardianship situation is the civil
commitment of mentally ill persons. The Supreme Court has held that
one who is civilly committed is entitled to due process; 30 however, it
has not specifically addressed the issue of what constitutes proper com-
mitment procedures. 131 Nevertheless, several federal and state court de-
cisions have dealt with this question. These cases reflect the general
theme that a person who may be deprived of his liberty by the state is
constitutionally guaranteed certain procedural protections before that
deprivation can occur. 132 Without exception, these cases recognize the
123. The sixth amendment to the Federal Constitution provides in part that: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall. . . have the assistance of counsel for his defence." This provision
was specifically made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Gideon v.
wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
124. Seeln re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Heryford
v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). See also Individual Rights, supra note 68, at 477; PrAoec-
live Services, supra note 3, at 245.
125. The juvenile setting has long been considered civil for purposes of sixth amendment
procedural protection.
126. 383 U.S. 542 (1966).
127. Id. at 554. The consequence of a juvenile court waiver in this case, was that Kent would
be exposed to the possibility of a death sentence when tried by the adult court. If there was no
waiver, he would only be subject to treatment in a home for minors until the age of 21.
128. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
129. Id. at 36.
130. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
131. Id at 573.
132. In one of the earlier cases dealing with procedural rights in a commitment setting,
Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964), the Kentucky Supreme Court authorized
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right to counsel as essential to satisfy the mandate of the due process
clause.
The leading case favoring greater procedural protection for an in-
dividual subject to a commitment proceeding is the Tenth Circuit deci-
sion of Heryford v. Parker.133 There the court determined that the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Gault134 applied in a commitment
setting because of the strong possibility of involuntary incarceration.
The court noted that it is the possibility of confinement, irrespective of
its purpose, which gives rise to the procedural requirements of the due
process clause.13- The Heryford court concluded that due process re-
quired the state to assure representation by legal counsel at every step
of the commitment proceeding.1 36
The courts have found that the determinative factor necessitating
the appointment of counsel for unrepresented defendants in criminal,
juvenile, and civil commitment proceedings is the individual's potential
loss of liberty. In this respect, the guardianship proceeding is analgous,
as the prospective ward is subject to a substantial deprivation of liberty
upon a determination of incompetency. 137 This analogy compels the
appointment of counsel for an unrepresented, prospective ward to
guarantee due process in Oklahoma guardianship proceedings.
C Jury trial
During the early stages of American jurisprudence, incom-
pentency determinations were made by the courts of equity.138 Conse-
quently, guardianship hearings acquired the designation of "special
proceedings."' 39 Due to the equitable nature of the proceeding, the
right to trial by jury, was not recognized by the courts. 4 ° If the right to
procedural protection identical to that afforded the criminal defendant. This broad holding was
justified solely on the grounds that the proceeding might lead to the loss of personal liberty. Id at
682. See State v. United States Veterans Hosp., 268 Minn. 213, -, 128 N.W.2d 710, 716-17 (1964).
133. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). See notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
134. See notes 128-29 supra and accompanying text.
135. See note 61 supra.
136. 396 F.2d at 396. See also Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1129 (D. Haw.
1976); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1050-51 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 431 U.S. 119 (1977); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell
v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1092 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078, 1098 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473, on
remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated andremanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on
remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
137. See notes 52-71 supra and accompanying text.
138. A.B.A. STUDY, supra note 58, at 250.
139. See In re Washam's Estate, 364 P.2d 896, 898 (Okla. 1961). Cf. In re Vaughn's Guardi-
anship, 205 Okla. 438, 239 P.2d 403 (1952) (restoration to capacity is a special proceeding).
140. Cf. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 133 (1881), where the Court said: "If it be conceded
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a jury trial existed at all in an incompetency determination, it existed
solely because it was conferred by statute. 4'
In Ned v. Robinson,'42 the Oklahoma Supreme Court construed
the pertinent guardianship statutes and held that they neither contem-
plated nor required a jury trial in an incompetency proceeding. 43 In
addition, the Court reviewed the claim that the right to jury trial guar-
anteed by the constitution provision' 44 had been violated. It concluded
that because there had never been a right to a jury trial in an incompe-
tency proceeding prior to statehood, the constitutional provision had
not been transgressed.' 45
Attempts to extend the Federal Constitution's mandate of a jury
trial146 to areas analogous to the guardianship setting have been re-
jected. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,'47 the Court declined to revamp
the juvenile proceeding there under review into a full adversarial hear-
ing. The court declared that the jury trial would not markedly increase
the accuracy of the fact finding process, but would, conversely, hinder
the ability of the juvenile court to function in an informal, non-crimi-
nal atmosphere. 148 In recent years courts have applied the Mceiver
holding in the civil commitment area and rejected demands for a jury
trial when it is not specifically provided for by statute. 149 The expressed
rationale, which parallels that given in McKeiver, is that the benefits of
or clearly shown that a case belongs to. . .[equity], the trial of questions involved in it belongs to
the court itself, no matter what may be its importance or complexity." Accord, Katchen v. Landy,
382 U.S. 323, 337 (1966).
141. See People v. Bradley, 22 Ill. App. 3d 1076,-, 318 N.E.2d 267, 275 (1974). Cf People v.
Amor, 12 Cal. 3d 20, 523 P.2d 1173, 114 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974) (jury cannot be demanded as a
matter of law in a special proceeding, unless it is expressly made available by statute).
142. 181 Okla. 507, 74 P.2d 1156 (1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 550 (1938).
143. Id. at 509, 74 P.2d at 1159.
144. OKLA. CONsT. art. 2, § 19.
145. 181 Okla. at 509, 74 P.2d at 1159. SeeExparteDagley, 35 Okla. 180, 128 P. 699 (1912).
For a collection of cases on this point of law, see Annot., 33 A.L.R. 2d 1145 (1954).
146. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a jury trial is not essential in all
types of cases to achieve a fundamentally fair result. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158
(1968). The rationale behind such a conclusion is premised on the belief that ajudge is as capable
as a jury in accurately finding the necessary facts. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551
(1971) (White, J., concurring). This presumption is buttressed by the fact that juries quite often are
not required in cases of equity, probate, or workmen's compensation. Id at 543 (Blackmun, J.,
plurality).
147. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
148. Id at 545-51. For a concise recapitulation of the history and theory underlying the juve-
nile court system, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1967).
149. See, e.g., Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 516 (D. Neb. 1975); Bartley v. Kremens,
402 F. Supp. 1039, 1051 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 119
(1977); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 394-95 (M.D. Ala. 1974). Cf. Gomez v. Miller, 341 F.
Supp. 323, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (due process does not require a jury trial on the issue of danger-
ousness), aft'd, 412 U.S. 914 (1973).
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increased procedural fairness and community input will not be suffi-
ciently realized to outweigh the state's interests in economy and infor-
mality.15 0
Simon v. Craft,'5' an early Supreme Court case, held that due pro-
cess did not require a particular mode of hearing for insanity pro-
ceedings. Rather, it requires only "a regular course of proceedings" in
which the individual has proper notice and the opportunity to defend
himself.'52 At least one court has construed this holding as a clear
enunciation of the position that due process does not require a jury trial
in an incompetency hearing.'53
Considering the rights which are at stake in the guardianship pro-
ceeding, the individual accused of incompetency should be assured a
hearing in which genuine community standards are applied. Against
this consideration must be balanced the legitimate state objectives of
providing a quick, efficient, and informal method of appointing a
guardian for those who are in need of protection. In light of the
Supreme Court's view that a trial by jury is not an essential component
of either a fundamentally fair hearing or accurate factfinding, 154 it is
highly unlikely that the Court would mandate a jury trial for an incom-
petency adjudication on the basis of due process.
There are, however, unique features of Oklahoma law whicth may
provide for such a right under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The basic command of the equal protection clause
is that persons similarly situated be treated alike in the absence of a
rational justification for a difference in treatment.'55 The Oklahoma
150. See, e.g., Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 516 (D. Neb. 1975); Bartley v. Kremens,
402 F. Supp. 1039, 1051 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 119
(1977); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 394-95 (M.D. Ala. 1974). Cf. Gomez v. Miller, 341 F.
Supp. 323, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (due process does not require a jury trial on the issue of danger-
ousness), aId'a 412 U.S. 914 (1973).
151. 182 U.S. 427 (1901).
152. Id. at 437.
153. Ward v. Booth, 197 F.2d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1952). But see Hager v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 43 F. Supp. 22, 26 (E.D. Ky. 1942) where the court said:
I do not believe that under our Federal or State Constitutions a person can be declared
incompetent and have his property taken out of his hand or be placed in confinement
without the intervention of a jury and the verdict of a jury declaring him to be non sui
juris.
See also Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 152 U.S. 160, 171 (1894), where the
Court in construing a special statutory proceeding said that "[a] jury trial is not in all cases essen-
tial to due process of law."
154. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971) (Blackmun, J., plurality). See
also note 146 supra and accompanying text.
155. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Barbier v. Connolly, 113
U.S. 27, (1885). As Justice Frankfurter noted in Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940), "The Con-
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statute 1-6specifically provides the right of a jury trial to minor wards
alleged to be mentally incompetent. This right is denied to other classes
of persons subject to the same proceeding. 157 Nevertheless, the stan-
dard for determining incompetency and the purposes of appointing a
guardian are the same for both classes. In terms of fundamental rights
and liberties, no difference exists between the two classes in relation to
the purpose of the statute. In the absence of a rational basis to support
this distinction in procedure, the state may not constitutionally grant
the right to some individuals, while denying it to others."1"
Support for this claim of an equal protection violation can be
drawn from Supreme Court decisions dealing with similar inconsistent
allocations of procedural protection in the civil commitment context. In
Baxstrom v. Herold159 the Court dealt with a New York law which
provided for the commitment of mentally ill inmates to a state hospital
upon the expiration of their prison terms. The procedure used to com-
mit inmates was similar to that prescribed for the civil commitment of
other persons alleged to be mentally ill, except that the non-penal
group had the right to review de novo in a trial by jury on the question
of their sanity.' 6 ° The Court concluded that because the state had cre-
ated a substantial review proceeding on the issue of insanity, it could
not arbitrarily withhold it from some without violating the equal pro-
stitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same." Id at 147. Accord, Norvel v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 423-24 (1963).
156. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58 § 887 (1971), provides:
Any person having a legal guardian, and who is about to arrive at legal age,
against whom a petition has been filed, asking that he or she be declared incompetent,
shall have the right to have the question of competency determined by a jury under the
same procedure now in force in Civil Cases ....
This section does not mandate ajury trial, but only confers a right to demand it. Johnson v. Guy,
165 Okla. 156, 25 P.2d 625 (1933). Although this statute is over 50 years old, it has never been
construed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court on equal protection grounds.
157. See, e.g., Ned v. Robinson, 181 Okla. 507, 509, 74 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1937), cerl. denled,
304 U.S. 550 (1938) (adults who are accused of being incompetent have no right to a jury trial on
the issue of competency).
158. In addition, "[T]he distinction must have some relevance to the purpose for which the
classification is made. ... Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954). "[E]qual
protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the particular
disadvantage of a suspect class." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312
(1976). The jury trial is not a fundamental right in this situation. See notes 138-155 supra and
accompanying text. Nor can those adults subject to incompetency proceedings constitute a suspect
class for purposes of equal protection analysis. Therefore the rational basis test is the proper stan-
dard to use in determining whether OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 887 (1971) denies those of legal age
equal protection of the laws.
159. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
160. Id. at I 11.
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tection clause.16' In reaching this decision, the Court rejected the state's
proffered distinction between the criminally insane and civilly insane.
It noted that such a distinction, while appropriate in determining the
type of custodial or medical care to be given to the patient, is irrelevant
in determining whether the person is mentally ill.162
Recognizing the substantial similarity between the New York
commitment scheme invalidated in Baxstrom and the current
Oklahoma guardianship statute, the conclusion is inescapable that the
latter denies equal protection to the alleged adult incompetent. It is
difficult to perceive any rational basis upon which the state can predi-
cate a decision to allow jury trials for persons already subject to a-
guardianship because of their minority, while denying the same right to
adults who have as much at stake in terms of fundamental rights and
liberties.16
3
An alternative equal protection argument can be made based on
the Oklahoma statute which gives a prospective mental patient the
161. Id.
162. Id. In addition, the Court held that Baxstrom was denied equal protection by the state
when he was committed to a hospital maintained by the Department of Corrections because of an
administrative finding of dangerousness. All others committed to a hospital maintained by the
Corrections Department had their dangerous propensities judicially determined. Id at 112-115.
In Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), the Court held that a state denied equal protec-
tion of the law when it provided the right to a jury trial for civil commitment generally, but denied
the right for commitments based on a conviction for a sex crime. The statutory scheme provided
for the commitment of criminal sex offenders in lieu of a penal sentence. At the end of the maxi-
mum allowable sentence for the criminal offense, the criminal patient was subject to renewal pro-
ceedings in the same manner as the other civilly committed patients. The renewal proceeding
allowed the state to recommit any patient for five year intervals based on new findings of fact by
the court that he was still dangerous to society. In effect, the criminal patient could be detained
beyond his maximum term through the renewal proceeding without the opportunity of having a
jury determine whether he met the standards for commitment. This renewal method, the Court
found, was substantially similar to the post-sentence commitment procedure that was ruled un-
constitutional in Baxstrom. Id. at 511.
In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), the Court held that a state statute which pro-
vided for pretrial commitment of incompetent criminal defendants denied equal protection be-
cause it subjected such persons "to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent
standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses." Id. at
730.
163. Cf. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 395 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (granting right to a jury
trial on the basis of the irrelevant factor of present confinement violates equal protection); In re
W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 486 P.2d 1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971) (denying the right to a jury trial on the
basis of prior detention as a juvenile, while granting the right to other members of the public,
denies equal protection to the former).
If, hypothetically, the law allowed the alleged adult incompetent the right to demand ajury
trial on the question of his competence, and at the same time denied such a right to the minor
whose guardianship will expire upon his arrival at legal age, then the denial of equal protection
would fit the Baxstrom mold more closely. Such a conclusion, however, forcibly suggests that the
converse would also deny equal protection.
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right to demand a jury trial on the issue of his sanity.1 64 Because the
prospective mental patient and the alleged incompetent may suffer
identical deprivation of rights and liberties, it can be argued that they
are similarly situated. 16 This theory, however, was expressly rejected
by a North Carolina federal court in French v. Blackburn. 66 There the
three judge court determined that because the standards and purposes
of civil commitment were "entirely different" from the standards and
purposes of appointing a guardian, the two classes of individuals were
not similarly situated and equal protection was not denied. 167
Nevertheless, the statutes construed in French can be distinguished
from the Oklahoma provisions in several ways. First, the Oklahoma
civil commitment procedure, unlike its North Carolina counterpart, 168
allows the judge, upon a determination that a person is in need of treat-
ment, to appoint a guardian for that person according to the standards
enunciated in the guardianship provisions.1 69 Therefore, if the civil
commitment determination is made by a jury, then the judge has the
benefit of the jury's evaluation of the mentally ill person when he
makes the decision to appoint a guardian. Concomitantly, the person
who is civilly committed and declared incompetent at the same hearing
has had the additional benefit of a jury's assessment of his mental
state.170
164. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 54.1 (B) (8) (Supp. 1977).
165. See Protective Services, supra note 3, at 251.
166. 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977). In this case, the petitioner who had been civilly
committed without the benefit of ajury trial, argued that since individuals subject to guardianship
proceedings had the right to a jury trial, he had been denied equal protection of the laws. This is
the exact opposite of the current Oklahoma statutory scheme.
167. Id. at 1361. The court's analysis pointed out that even if the classification did affect
similarly situated individuals, the distinction in procedures would still be justified under the ra-
tional basis test. The rational relation, the court hypothesized, could be found in the legitimate
legislative belief that a determination of whether a person is capable of handling his own affairs is
"more susceptible to the practical wisdom of a jury" than a determination of whether a person is
mentally ill and dangerous. Id
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.1-58.21 (Supp. 1977).
169. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 54.1 (F) (Supp. 1977), indicates that a guardian may be ap-
pointed at the same hearing in which the individual is committed. The language of the new law is
significantly broader than the provision which it supplants, OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 55 (Supp.
1976), in that the latter allowed the court to appoint a guardian of the person for the mentally ill
individual, provided however, that the guardianship continue only until the person was admitted
to an institution. The new law, on the other hand, makes no express limitation on the duration of
the guardianship. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 64 (Supp. 1977), seems to be inconsistent with the afore-
mentioned section in that it provides that no one committed for treatment under a court order
may be considered mentally or legally incompetent except those who have been adjudged incom-
petent in separate and independent proceedings.
170. In contrast to this situation is the possibility that a person may be judicially declared
incompetent and appointed a guardian who at a later time subjects his ward to "voluntary" hospi-
talization. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 58 (1971). Arguably this possibility relates to the constitu-
tionality of§ 58 and not the guardianship procedures of OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 851-854 (1971 &
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The second distinguishing characteristic found in the Oklahoma
statutes is that it requires the judge to appoint a guardian for a person
who originally was alleged to be mentally ill and in need of hospitaliza-
tion, but was instead found to be mentally incompetent.1 'T Merely be-
cause a different proceeding was initiated, the person alleged to be
mentally ill is afforded a trial by jury,'72 while those subject to incom-
petency proceedings through the guardianship statutes are not.' 73
These unique features of Oklahoma law create a situation where
two groups of persons are subject to the appointment of a guardian.
Therefore it can be asserted that the two groups are similarly situated.
Nevertheless each group is subject to the appointment of a guardian
through different proceedings with varying rights and safeguards. Such
different treatment is constitutionally permissible only if a rational jus-
tification exists.' 74 Because the purposes and standards for appointing a
guardian are exactly the same for each class, there is no rational justifi-
cation and the treatment violates the equal protection clause.
V. CONCLUSION
The imposition of an unwanted guardianship upon an individual
is a serious encroachment of his constitutional rights and liberties. In
Oklahoma, this transgression occurs with minimal procedural guaran-
tees afforded to the alleged incompetent. The sole justification for the
Supp. 1977). Nevertheless, it points out the fact that the alleged incompetent individual and the
person allegedly in need of commitment are both subject to the appointment of a guardian and
commitment in an institution subsequent to an adverse determination of their respective mental
conditions.
171. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 65 (1971), provides in part that:
If the Sanity Commission. . . determine[s] that the person ... is mentally in-
competent, but that it is not necessary to hospitalize him for treatment. . . they shall so
state in their certificate. If after a full hearing and examination the person. . . is found
to be mentally incompetent but it is found that it is not necessary to hospitalize him, the
judge. . . must issue an order adjudging the person mentally incompetent and must
appoint a guardian of his person and estate ....
(emphasis added). For discussion ofjudicial economy as a rational justification for a difference in
treatment, see note 174 infra.
172. See note 164 supra and accompanying text.
173. See note 142-143 supra and accompanying text.
174. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). A possible rationale for the
distinction in procedural protection between the two groups is that once a person, originally al-
leged to be mentally ill, is instead found by a jury or a court to be mentally incompetent, then the
state should be allowed to immediately appoint a guardian in order to protect the individual and
to avoid the administrative cost and inconvenience of having another hearing when the outcome
would be foreordained. This type of reasoning can be attacked on the basis of Supreme Court
holdings which indicate that the state cannot deprive the individual of procedural due process or
equal protection of the laws merely because of expense, or judicial and administrative conven-
ience. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (Opinion of Brennan, J.) (equal
protection); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (equal protection); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 266 (1970) (due process).
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current paucity of procedural guarantees is the avowed benign pater-
nalism of the parens patriae power of the state. A plethora of court
opinions in analogous areas, however, have recognized that irrespective
of a state's benevolent intent, it cannot deprive an individual of his
liberty and property without adherence to certain procedural safe-
guards.
The requirements of due process in the guardianship setting
should not depend upon a doctrine which has been described by the
Supreme Court as "murky," and whose historic credentials are sus-
pect.175 Likewise, the mandate of due process should not depend upon
a doctrine which generally has been so obfuscated with the state's po-
lice power that procedural guarantees may, and quite often do, vary
from state to state. Neoteric conceptions of the fourteenth amendment
compel the conclusion that Oklahoma guardianship law is sorely in
need of restructuring to achieve procedural parity with analogous areas
of the law. It remains then for the courts, if not the legislature, to pierce
the benevolent shroud which obscures the guardianship hearing and to
provide the alleged incompetent with procedural protection consonant
with the rights being deprived.
James Christopher Redding
175. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967). Cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), where the
Court, in holding that a state's jurisdiction could not vary according to its classification of the
proceeding as in rem or in personam, stated: "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice' can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified
as by the adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitu-
tional heritage." Id. at 212. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312
(1950), the Court held that the requirements of the fourteenth amendment could not depend upon
a state's classification of proceedings as in rem, in personam or quasi-in-rem.
[Vol. 13:579
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